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LABOR LAW AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS* AND JAMES GILMER BOWMAN, JR.**
LABOR LAW
Inducing Breach of Contract: Howard v. Haven' was the only case
during the survey period which presented a legal problem relating to
the activities of a labor organization. In this case an electrical con-
tractor sought an injunction and damages because of the acts of a
local labor union, its business agent, and other named defendants in
preventing the plaintiff from carrying out a hospital construction
contract. On the trial of the case the determinative issue became
whether or not the defendants brought about a breach of the contract
which the complainant claimed to have had with the general con-
tractor on the project in question. In response to specific questions
the jury found that the defendant local labor union did unlawfully
procure a breach of contract which complainant had with the general
contractor, but it answered the same question in the negative with
respect to the local union's business agent and another named de-
fendant. Damages were assessed by the jury at $7,330, which were
trebled in the judgment entered by the chancellor pursuant to Wil-
liams code section 7811.2
The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether
the judgment was void by reason of the fact that the verdict of the
jury had exonerated the agent through which the local union acted.
The Supreme Court in turn affirmed the judgment, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Neil. The lower courts were justified, the
opinion states, in finding that the local was an active participant;
"that others, who were identified with the Union, were taking part
in the controversy, all of which resulted in a forcible breach of the
contract. The petitioner, Local No. 175, being a voluntary association,
couldn't act except through its membership. Its conduct could be, and
was, shown by circumstances indicating that it was a joint conspirator
along with other named defendants."3 The opinion then adds the state-
ment that there is material evidence to show that the complainants
lost the contract because of the activity of Local No. 175, Burnette
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
Attorney, Office of Solicitor, United States Department of Labor; member,
Tennessee Bar. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent those of the United States Department of Labor or
any other Federal agency.
1. 198 Tenn. 572, 281 S.W.2d 480 (1955).
2. Now TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1706 (1956).
3. 198 Tenn. at 579, 281 S.W.2d at 483.
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(the loca's business agent exonerated by jury verdict), Williams
(a member of the local not named as defendant) and Cofer (a named
defendant exonerated by jury verdict):
It is not material that Williams was not sued as a joint wrongdoer, as
well as other members of the Union; nor is it important that the jury
should find against one defendant and in favor of another, since all joint
wrongdoers are liable jointly and severally for all damages. Nor can
the one against whom the judgment is rendered escape liability on the
ground that others were acquitted. The record discloses the most convinc-
ing evidence of the fact that Local No. 175 was vitally interested in
securing the Warlick contract for Chattanooga contractors who em-
ployed only Union workers. We think the weight of the evidence shows
that Local No. 175 was the principal conspirator. Its members were the
ultimate beneficiaries, regardless of any office they might hold in the
Union.4
The opinion of the court declares that the doctrine of respondeat
superior has no application to the case so as to relieve the local union
because of the exoneration of its business agent. This is found to be
so because of the existence of a conspiracy or common purpose and
design instead of a master-servant relationship. Loveman Co. v. Bay-
less,5 which declares that a verdict against a master based on the acts
of a servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior can not stand
in the face of a verdict in favor of the servant, is distinguished on the
basis that the local union did not occupy the relationship of master to
its co-defendants as servants. The local union either authorized Bur-
nette to engage in unlawful activity with respect to the contract or
ratified his action by accepting the benefits resulting from his acts.
"We think it was within the province of the jury to find against both
Burnette and Local No. 175. The verdict in favor of Burnette did not
affect the verdict and judgment against his co-defendant."
In denying the petition to rehear in this case the court also rejected
a contention that the order in this case violated rights of free speech
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Con-
stitution. The matter of federal pre-emption or occupancy of the field
with regulation under the Taft-Hartley Act6 was not discussed in any
portion of the court's opinion.
WORK-M-IeS COMPENSATION
Employees' claims for workmen's compensation were involved in
twenty-three of the cases before the Supreme Court during the survey
year, and three cases presented questions of first impression. Although
4. Id. at 580, 281 S.W.2d at 483.
5. 128 Tenn. 307, 160 S.W. 841 (1913).
6. Labor-Management Relations Act. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158
(1956). See Weber v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
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the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Law7 was enacted over
thirty-seven years ago, controversy still rages with apparently un-
diminished vigor over its proper interpretation and application.
The Employment Relationship: Two decisions in the reported cases
turned on the existence of the employment relationship. In both cases,
the court affirmed compensation awards on the ground that the in-
jured workmen were employees rather than independent contractors
inasmuch as the employers had not relinquished their right to control
the performance of the work.
Bond Brothers, Inc. v. Spence8 concerned a truck owner-driver who
contracted to haul logs in his truck for a company engaged in cutting
timber and sawing it into lumber. The agreement was indefinite as to
duration and no specific amount of timber at a particular place was
set aside for the trucker to haul. He was paid for each trip, and pay-
ment was based on the amount hauled and the length of the trip. The
lower court, in holding him an employee, relied on the fact that the
checks he received in payment bore the following provision im-
mediately above the place for his endorsement:
This draft is accepted in full payment for the material or services speci-
fied, and the endorser hereby warrants that the production of said material
or the rendering of the services specified, was in compliance with the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.
The Supreme Court, through a rather full treatment of the case by
Justice Prewitt, said the employer had thereby acknowledged that
the truck driver came within the provisions of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act as an employee since that Act deals only with employ-
ers and employees, not with independent contractors. The opinion goes
on to point out that some evidence of control over the truck driver
was indicated because he had been instructed to make deliveries to
several different towns and the employer's foreman had accompanied
him on occasional trips. The employer also could have terminated the
relationship at any time. Relying on a prior definition of "independent
contractor,"9 the court stated that the fact that the driver was paid
by the trip indicated employment to work by the "piece" rather than
to do "a piece of work" in this case since the contract's duration was
7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-901 to -1211 (1956).
8. 198 Tenn. 316, 279 S.W.2d 509 (1955).
9. "One who contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods
and without being subject to control of his employer, except as to the result
of the work, and who has the right to employ and direct the action of thq
workmen independent of his employer, and free from any superior authority
in the employer to say how the specified work shall be done, or what the
laborers shall do as the work progresses; one who undertakes to produce a
given result without being in any way controlled as to the methods by which
he attains that result." Odom v. Sanford & Treadway, 156 Tenn. 202, 207,
299 S.W. 1045, 1046 (1927).
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indefinite and a specified amount of timber had not been designated
for hauling. The court concluded by holding that a master-servant
relationship is presumed once employment is shown and the employer
has the burden of showing the independent contractor relationship if
he would avoid compensation liability on that ground.10 Here the
employer had not evinced to the court's satisfaction the lack of a
right to control the driver's conduct in the manner of doing the work.
The result in the case does not appear to be particularly questionable
even though the employee here provided a major piece of equipment,
i.e., the truck. Professor Larson reports "a growing tendency to classify
owner-drivers as employees when they perform continuous service
which is an integral part of the employer's business."'" The check
endorsement relative to compliance with the Fair Labor Standards
Act had no necessary significance in the question here considered.
Such an endorsement is for the purpose of affording protection under
the "hot goods" provision of § 15 (a) (1) of the statute. 12 This use of
the language is consistent with the endorser being an independent con-
tractor or separate business entirely.
In Barker v. Curtis3 the petitioner had a contract with a coal com-
pany to mine coal on land leased to the company by a corporation
which purchased all the coal mined on the land. The coal was sold to
the coal company and it in turn sold to the corporation. The company
furnished the major items of equipment to establish the mine, though
the petitioner supplied part of the necessary equipment. He employed
six miners, had a collective bargaining agreement covering them with
a union, and withheld federal income and social security taxes from
the wages he paid them. After his accident, he operated the mine
through his brother until he sold his equipment and ceased his con-
nection with the coal company. The company told him where to mine
the coal, how to do it, how much to mine, and where to deliver it. The
company also laid out plans and specifications for the structural
development of the mine and its representatives or those of the corpo-
ration made weekly inspection trips through the mine. This was
apparently sufficient evidence of a right to control to satisfy the trial
court of the existence of an employei-employee relatibnship for com-
pensation purposes. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Burnett, indicated its limited function in reviewing such a finding
and its obligation to give the statute a liberal construction in favor of
the fact of employment. The court held that there was material evi-
dence to support the trial court's finding, a question of fact for the
10. Citing D. M. Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 514, 206 S.W.2d 897,
904 (1947).
11. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 44.34 (1952).
12. 52 STAT. 1052 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 215 (1956).
13. 287 S.W.2d 43 (Tenn. 1956).
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chancellor in this particular case. However, the court also observed
several additional factors supporting the status of employment rather
than that of independent contractor. First, it found that the petitioner
could have been discharged if he had failed to conduct the operations
in a manner approved or directed by the company. Second, the com-
pany carried workmen's compensation insurance on him as an em-
ployee and had so informed him. Though the court stated that evidence
of such insurance coverage had no probative value per se,14 the fact
that he had been informed that he was covered tended to indicate
that the company considered him an employee. Third, there was some
evidence that the coal company lacked substance as an independent
enterprise between the petitioner and the corporation which owned
the land and purchased the coal. The company's only responsibility
was inferred as being that of writing compensation insurance on the
petitioner and those working for him. The court concluded that on the
evidence as a whole the company had reserved control over the main
aspects of the work and the petitioner's work was "more or less a
menial part."
The case stresses the need for a full consideration of all the facts
in the case of an alleged independent contractor and that there is
no "absolute formula" whereby the question may be determined.
Injury by Accident Arising out of Employment: In order to recover
workmen's compensation, a covered employee must suffer an injury
by accident "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment. The
former phrase is simply an expression of the causal connection which
must exist between the employment (including its nature, its condi-
tions, its obligations and its incidents) and the injury. The injury must
be rationally connected with the work by something more than mere
coincidence. The determination of this connection was the principal
problem in several of the reported cases during the year. The require-
ment of an "accident" will frequently be satisfied by the same evidence
that shows causal connection.
Lee v. King Brothers Shoe Co.15 involved the admissibility of hear-
say evidence to prove the occurrence of a work-connected injury by
accident. The opinion states that there is no question in the case about
disability arising out of employment but only whether or not deceased
died from accidental means. According to the testimony of a music
store employee, the employee of a shoe store came into a music store
14. Citing Weeks v. McConnell, 196 Tenn. 110, 264 S.W.2d 573 (1954). But
cf. Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323 (1950)
(workmen's compensation insurance coverage is some evidence of the em-
ployer-employee relationship). Quaere whether Weeks v. McConnell, supra,
actually supports the court's statement. Though coverage may be evidence
of the employment relationship, it does not appear to have been a decisive
point in reported cases. See 1 LAsoN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 46.40.
15. 198 Tenn. 458, 281 S.W.2d 49 (1955).
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next door and said a case of shoes had fallen on him and that he was
suffering great pain. The same witness testified that the deceased
employee was walking slowly in a stooped position and holding his
stomach as he entered the store and remained that way as he walked
out of sight after leaving it. The music store was a short distance
from the shoe store where he was employed, and there were in fact
heavy cases of shoes stacked up in the shoe store. Though the shoe
store employee had been in good health before suffering the injury,
he died four days later, and the medical testimony indicated that the
injury contributed to his death. The lower court admitted the deceased
employee's statement in evidence and awarded compensation to his
widow.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Prewitt, affirmed on
the ground that the statements were apparently made within a few
minutes after his injury when he appeared to be in such pain and
under such excitement as to preclude any reasonable possibility of
fabrication. 16 This, of course, was nothing more than an application
of the so-called res gestae exception to the hearsay rule 7 and was
recognized by the court as such. The event causing the deceased em-
ployee's injury apparently was unwitnessed, and the testimony of
the music store employee indicated that the deceased's statements
were uttered under circumstances tending to make them credible.
If they were inadmissible, his widow would likely have found it
difficult, if not impossible, to establish any rational connection between
his employment and his injury and subsequent death since the Ten-
nessee court will not indulge a presumption of employment connection
for unexplained injuries to employees in the course of their employ-
ment.
18
The court affirmed another compensation award in Great American
Indemnity Co. v. Friddel'9 because the record contained sufficient
evidence to show that the injury arose out of employment. A car-
penter fell from a scaffold at work and injured his hand and ankle.
Shortly thereafter he developed stomach pains which were reported to
a physician within three or four days of the fall and which later be-
came so serious that an operation was performed. A ruptured appen-
dix was discovered and removed, and a partial disability resulted.
Some of the medical evidence indicated that the fall could have
aggravated a pre-existing condition and caused the rupture. That is,
a "fecalith, 'kind of a little hard marble'" was found during the
16. Citing National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80
S.W.2d 92 (1935).
17. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1745-46 (3d ed. 1940).
18. Wilson v. St. Louis Terminal Distributing Co., 198 Tenn. 171, 278 S.W.2d
681 (1955).
19. 198 Tenn. 360, 280 S.W.2d 908 (1955).
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operation and there was medical testimony to the effect that the
fall could have caused this to block the base of the appendix, thereby
causing the rupture. Other medical evidence was to the effect that
it was exceedingly improbable that a ruptured appendix would have
a traumatic origin. In an opinion by Special Justice Clement, the
Supreme Court, in accordance with its usual rules, held that the
credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence were for the trial
court's determination. Any reasonable doubt about the "arising out of"
factor would be resolved in favor of the injured employee.20 The
employee's petition alleged he had "suffered an internal rupture in
the lower quadrant of his abdomen," and the court held this suf-
ficient fairly to raise the issue of an aggravation of a pre-existing
condition, the fact proved.21 This again illustrates the court's liberality
in dealing with the sufficiency of pleadings.
22
In Wilson v. St. Louis Terminal Distributing Co.,23 the court, in an
opinion by Justice Prewitt, affirmed the dismissal of a widow's com-
pensation suit because she failed to show that her husband's unex-
plained death resulted from an injury by accident arising out of his
employment. The deceased employee, a night watchman for a barge
company, had walked down an incline approximately 250 feet long
and at about a 35 degree grade to reach the place where he performed
his duties. Before reaching the cabin where he was found he walked
down and up steps four feet eight inches in height, told the employee
he was relieving, in passing him, that he had a pain in his chest and
was going to sit down. Over seven hours later he was found dead in
a chair in the cabin. There was no evidence either of exertion aggra-
vating a pre-existing diseased condition, of an internal or external
accident, or of violence. The employee had previously been in apparent
good health. On these facts, the court held that the fact that an em-
ployee is found dead at the place of employment during working hours
does not of itself create a prima facie case of compensation liability.24
Some connection between the death and the employment must be
shown. In view of the paucity of the evidence tending to indicate such
a work-connection, the result is in keeping with established precedent
in Tennessee.
25
20. Compare the instant case with Lynch v. LaRue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278
S.W.2d 85 (1955), discussed in Sanders & Bowman, Labor Law and Work-
men's Compensation-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1037, 1050-51
(1955).
21. Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 194 Tenn. 467, 253 S.W.2d 552 (1952).
22. See Sanders and Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-
1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAm. L. REv. 861, 879 (1954).
23. 198 Tenn. 171, 278 S.W.2d 681 (1955).
24. Citing Home Ice Co. v. Franzini, 161 Tenn. 395, 32 S.W.2d 1032 (1930);
Farris v. Yellow Cab Co., 189 Tenn. 46, 222 S.W.2d 187 (1949).
25. Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402 (1955); Farris v. Yellow
Cab Co., 189 Tenn. 46, 222 S.W.2d 187 (1949). See also McCormick v. National
City Bank, 303 N.Y. 5, 99 N.E.2d 887 (1951).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
One commentator has said: "When an employee is found dead under
circumstances indicating that death took place within the time and
space limits of the employment, in the absence of any evidence of
what caused the death most courts will indulge a presumption or in-
ference that the death arose out of the employment."26 However, he
also says that even in states having a statutory presumption of cover-
age under such circumstances, the presumption has not always been
applied in cases in which the death apparently resulted from a per-
sonal weakness or condition in the employee and there was no evi-
dence of any work exertion precipitating it.27
In the instant case the court's discussion of the lack of a prima
facie showing of liability begins with the statement:
Where it is shown that the employee is subjected to physical exertion
and that while so exerting himself is caused to be stricken with an
ailment from which he dies, a prima facie case is made. Milstead v.
Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610; Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.,
196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223.28
If this should be interpreted as requiring that the exertion and the
injury be synchronized then it must be observed that the court has
not so held in the cases cited. The Milstead opinion would not support
such an interpretation even though the facts in the case might. Neither
the facts nor the opinion in the Lay case would support such a view.
A requirement of this sort, taking literally the sentence quoted from
the opinion, would overrule sub silentio both the Lay case and others.
29
Other portions of the court's opinion are somewhat ambiguous with
respect to the requirements for a prima facie case in cases like the
instant one. The proper interpretation of the quoted sentence however
is undoubtedly found in the intention of the court to state that the
ailment causing death must be a result of the exertion, and not that
they must be synchronous. Otherwise, an unnecessarily restrictive
doctrine would be propounded which would not be supported by the
precedents cited.
In Nashville Bridge Co. v. Todd,30 an employee had been engaged as
a scraper inside compartments of steel river barges for about a week.
Though he was apparently in good health, he became sick one day
after lunch and died shortly after leaving work that afternoon. There
was evidence that people unaccustomed to working in the compart-
ments when there was excessive heat in them would be affected by
26. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 11 § 10.32.
27. Ibid.
28. 198 Tenn. at 175, 278 S.W.2d at 683.
29. See, e.g., Parrott v. Parrott, 198 Tenn. 96, 278 S.W.2d 83 (1955); Heron
v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402 (1955); Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953).
30. 286 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1956).
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such heat. The temperature in the compartment on the fatal day was
not shown, and, according to the court's opinion, there was no evidence
that the heat was excessive or that the employee was too hot. The
other employees in the compartment testified that they were not too
hot and that the deceased employee had not complained of the heat.
Therefore, the court reversed a compensation award because there was
no evidence to connect the employee's illness and death with his em-
ployment. According to the court's opinion, written by Justice Sweps-
ton, the employee could have become sick from causes completely inde-
pendent of the employment. Since no work-connection was demon-
strated, compensation was not authorized.
The court did, however, find a disability arising from employment in
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Roberts3 1 when an employee was prevented
from working because of the irritation caused by the stainless steel
wire used to sew up an incision. He had been operated on for a
compensable injury and had opened the incision in a subsequent
accident at work. The court said that an employee may recover for
either a new injury or an aggravation of a compensable injury result-
ing from medical or surgical treatment of it. The holding is in
accord with what is regarded as the majority rule.32
It might be pointed out here that the Supreme Court continues to
hold that on review it will examine the record only for the purpose of
determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by
material evidence and will not weigh or reweigh the evidence to
determine where the preponderance lies. Thus, the court affirmed
awards to employees found to suffer from the occupational disease
silicosis 3 even though in one case two doctors testified that the doctor
who diagnosed the silicosis (here silico-tuberculosis) could not have
done so with any certainty from the data upon which he relied, i.e.,
X-ray, clinical symptoms, and case history, since the employee was
suffering from tuberculosis and pneumoconiosis, a dust condition in
the lungs.34 The court said that the weight of evidence and the im-
peachment and credibility of the witnesses were to be left to the trial
court.
This latter point was decisive in Block Coal and Coke Co. v. Gib-
son.35 There the employee insisted he was disabled because of back
pains resulting from an unsuccessful operation. The doctor who per-
formed the operation stated it had been successful though another
doctor testified that he was unable to account for the petitioner's suf-
31. 198 Tenn. 386, 280 S.W.2d 918 (1955).
32. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 13.21.
33. Lodge Manufacturing Co. v. Wilkerson, 286 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1956);
Eggert v. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp., 286 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1956).
34. Lodge Manufacturing Co. v. Wilkerson, supra note 33, at 866.
35. 285 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1955).
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fering pain except by what he had been told by the petitioner. It
was his opinion that the condition preceding the operation might not
have been corrected if the employee continued to suffer these pains.
Both doctors added that they believed the employee to be telling the
truth about the pain. This had satisfied the trial court, and the
Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Chief Justice Neil. The
opinion states that, if both doctors found the employee credible, why
should the trial judge deny compensation on the ground that he was
a malingerer.
Injury by Accident in the Course of Employment: To determine
whether an injury occurs "in the course of" employment, consideration
is given to whether or not it is reasonably incident to the employment
in terms of the time, place and conduct of the employee when the
accident takes place.36
Greenfield v. Manufacturers Casualty Co. 37 was the only case during
the survey year in which the court was primarily concerned with this
aspect of the work-connection of an injury. The manager of a store
had no fixed working hours and sometimes worked at night. Her
district supervisor requested that she come back and work at the store
one night after her evening meal. She was told that the store was to
pay for her evening meal. She was injured on the way to one of the
three public eating places said to have been suggested by the super-
visor as good places for her to patronize to create good will for the
store. The Supreme Court affirmed a denial of workmen's compensa-
tion under these circumstances holding that the injury did not arise
out of or in the course of the employment. The employee was not
regarded as being engaged in any business for the benefit of her
employer. She was traveling along a route she had selected to one
of the suggested restaurants, not the one nearest the store, for what
was regarded as a purely personal purpose. The employer's intention
to pay for the meal was said to be merely indicative that additional
compensation would be paid for the work to be performed after she
returned to the employer's premises from the meal.
The fact that there was testimony indicating that the employer was
sufficiently interested in where the employee dined to make recom-
mendations about it tends to make the course of employment question
a close one. However, he apparently did not anticipate sufficient
benefit to require dining in one of the restaurants. Hence, the court
was perhaps justified in finding that the question was not close enough
36. HOROVrTZ, CURRENT TRENDS nv WommN's COMPENSATION 668 (1947);
1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 11 § 14:00; 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION TEXT § 1542 (3d ed. 1948).
37. 198 Tenn. 452, 281 S.W.2d 47 (1955).
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to make the usual "going and coming" rule inapplicable.38
Measure of Compensation and Computation of Benefits: The em-
ployee in Smith v. Morristown Poultry Co.39 had suffered an eye
injury which was found not to have been satisfactorily cured by
surgery. After the operation, she returned to the only type of work
she had ever performed-picking, dressing, and processing chickens-
at approximately the same rate of pay she enjoyed prior to the injury.
There was conflict in the medical evidence, but it was considered
sufficient to support the finding that she had suffered a 50% permanent
partial disability because of the 50% impairment of vision in one eye
due to the injury. The court, in an opinion by Special Justice Clement,
affirmed an award of compensation for the disability. The 1953 amend-
ments to what is now code section 50-100740 were not considered help-
ful to the defendants in the matter of measuring disability. The
opinion states that these amendments appeared to have liberalized
the law in favor of the employee rather than to have restricted com-
pensation for injury to a bodily member to the statutory schedule. It
does not appear that the court had so restricted recoveries even prior
to the 1953 amendments if the injury to the member had spread to
and interfered with other parts of the body.41 The finding of a dis-
ability impairing earning capacity was sufficiently supported by medi-
cal and other evidence even though the employee had not in fact
suffered an appreciable loss of earnings. This is in accord with the
well-settled Tennessee test in these cases and with the general rule.0
The 1953 amendment in the statute which now appears as the last
paragraph of code section 50-1007 (c) received its important interpre-
tation in Hooper v. Young Sales Corp.43 and Bituminous Casualty
38. For a discussion of this problem in general, see 1 LARSoN, op. cit. supra
note 11, §§ 15-18.
39. 198 Tenn. 412, 280 S.W.2d 929 (1955).
40. "All other cases of permanent partial disability not above enumerated
shall be apportioned to the body as a whole, which shall have a value of 30{
weeks, and there shall be paid compensation to the injured employee for the
proportionate loss of use of the body as a whole resulting from the injury."
TENN. CODE ArN. § 50-1007(c) (1956).
41. Russell v. Virginia Bridge and Iron Co., 172 Tenn. 268, 111 S.W.2d 1027
(1938); Central Surety and Insurance Corp., v. Court, 162 Tenn. 477, 36 S.W.2d
907 (1931); and Kingsport Silk Mlls v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470, 33 S.W.2d 90
(1930).
42. "The question is whether, in the open labor market, in his disabled con-
dition, the employee, after the injury, is able to earn in spite of his disability,
as much as he was able to earn before the injury." Greenville Cabinet Co. v.
Ramsey, 195 Tenn. 409, 414, 260 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1953). "Obviously, evidence
that at the time of the hearing below, the employee is earning wages, is evi-
dence that he has the capacity to earn them, but it is not conclusive evidence."
Id. at 416, 260 S.W.2d at 160. See, e.g., Crane Enamel Co. v. Jamison, 188
Tenn. 211, 217 S.W.2d 945 (1949); Agricola Furnace Co. v. Smity, 239 Ala.
488, 195 So. 743 (1940); Voight v. Industrial Comm'n, 297 Ill. 109, 130 N.E.
470 (1921).
43. 288 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. 1956).
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Corp. v. Smith.4 4 In each case the injured employee had sustained a
temporary total disability for a period of several weeks and a per-
manent partial disability of 50%. Justice Tomlinson wrote the opinion
of the court in the two decisions, each of which modified in some de-
gree the method of calculation utilized in the lower court.
In the Hooper case the court first rejected the argument that the
claimant (with a 50% disability) is entitled for 300 weeks to 50% of
60% of his average weekly wage until such 50% of such 60% reaches
the statutory weekly maximum. The court noted that section 50-
1007 (c) is expressly made subject to section 50-1007 (a) and that the
"natural construction" of the language of the latter subsection "is
that the employee is entitled to 60% of his average weekly wage until
such 60% thereof reaches the maximum of $28 per week."
The court then makes clear that the percentage of permanent dis-
ability has no relation to the weekly benefit figure but instead is used
to determine the number of weeks for which the benefits will be paid.
Section 50-1007 (c) gives the body as a whole a value of 300 weeks for
the purposes of determining the amount of an award for a permanent
partial disability. "If the body as a whole has a value of 300 weeks
then, in calculating the amount payable for a permanent loss of t
part of that body, or its use, it would necessarily follow that when the
loss is 50% of the body, the loss suffered by the employee and for
which he is entitled to compensation, is 150 weeks. '4
5
The third point of great significance in the Hooper case was the
court's conclusion that, by reason of the 1953 amendment, payments
for the weeks of total disability need not be credited against the award
for permanent partial disability (in the Hooper case, $28 per week for
150 weeks). The court noted the schedule of benefits provided for the
loss of specific members as set forth in the same section of the statute
and the fact that employees had been held to be entitled to the value
fixed in the schedule for a described loss in addition to compensation
received because of total temporary disability:
Notice has been taken of the fact that the Legislature provided that
the value fixed in its schedule for the loss or partial loss of the use of
a member of the body, such as the arm or eye, etc., shall be in addition
to the compensation received for temporary total disability. The Legis-
lature has now fixed in identically the same terms a value to that body
as a whole as the basis for determining the amount of compensation to
be received for permanent partial loss of its use.
It follows logically that the Legislature had the same intention in fixing
a value for the partial loss of the use of the body as it had in fixing a
value for the partial loss of the use of a member of the body. To otherwise
conclude would attribute to the Legislature an inconsistency not re-
vealed by the 1953 amendment, or by the provisions of the Workmen's
44. 288 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1956).
45. 288 S.W.2d at 705.
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Compensation Statute wherein is spelled out the formula for determining
the amount of compensation in cases of permanent partial loss of the
use of a member of the body or partial loss of the use of the body as
a whole.46
In Shaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,47 the court held that the
amount of compensation due for a compensable back injury, incurred
in January, 1953, is to be determined according to the last paragraph
of Williams code section 6878 (c) ,48 as it read at the time of the injury.
The employee was injured prior to the enactment of the 1953 amend-
ments raising the maximum compensation payable from $25 to $28 per
week. Therefore, the compensation payable was the maximum amount
allowed at the time of the injury instead of the increased amount.
Notice of Injury: The court held in Bond Brothers, Inc. v. Spence,49
that physical disability will excuse giving the employer the statutory
notice of injury.50 The injured employee had been unconscious or
semi-conscious and unable to write for over 30 days after the injury
and had failed to give the written notice, but the employer did have
actual notice of the injury. The court stated that the reasonableness
of the employee's excuse for failure to give the notice was for the
trial court's determination. 51 This treatment of the problem seems
to be entirely in line with the notice provisions in Williams code
section 6872.52
There was no reasonable excuse found for the failure to give the
requisite notice within 30 days from the date of injury in McCarty v.
Musgrave Pencil Co.,53 and the court affirmed a denial of compensation.
According to his own testimony the employee had suffered a hernia
while pushing a wheelbarrow at work. He felt a sharp pain in his
abdomen and noticed a protrusion there but failed to report the
incident to his employer. He continued to work for some time after
the 30-day notice period had passed. The employee suffered a dis-
abling heart attack as the result of a hernia operation. The court said
that in the absence of liability for the original injury, the hernia,
there could be no liability for the second injury, the heart attack. The
basis of liability for the second injury is that the causal connection
makes it a part of the original injury. With respect to the hernia, the
46. Ibid.
47. 288 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1956).
48. Now TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1007(c) (1956). The court cited Sun Coal
Co. v. Epperson, 178 Tenn. 114, 156 S.W.2d 400 (1941); Standard Surety &
Casualty Co. v. Sloan, 180 Tenn. 220, 173 S.W.2d 436 (1943).
49. 198 Tenn. 316, 279 S.W.2d 509 (1955).
50. Citing Watson v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp.,. 188 Tenn. 494, 221
S.W.2d 528 (1949).
51. Citing Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenh. 434, 181 s.W.2d
619"(1944).
52. Now TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1001 (1956). .,
53. 288 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1956).
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employee knew he had been injured on the day the alleged accident
occurred. The employer had no actual notice of the injury, and the
employee had no excuse for failing to give notice of his injury.4
Statute of Limitations: The employer in Adams v. Patterson55 had
voluntarily made payments to his injured employee in excess of the
amount required by the statute after telling him that he felt he
should make such payments as long as the employee was disabled.
Then he stopped the payments saying that he felt he had paid all he
was required to pay. The employee sued for compensation within a
.year from the date the payments ceased but over a year from the
date of the accident causing the injury. The lower court found that
the statute was not tolled since the payments were a gratuity, not
voluntary compensation payments. The Supreme Court reversed, in
an opinion by Justice Tomlinson, because it found no evidence to
support the finding. It considered the employer's remarks as a
recognition of his liability to pay as long as the employee was disabled
and apparently equated this with a recognition of his statutory lia-
bility.56 Since the suit was brought within one year from the date
the voluntary payments ceased, it was brought within the statutory
period.
5 7
The court held in Bradford v. Dixie Mercerizing Co.58 that an em-
ployee's suit was barred by the one year limitation period inasmuch
as it had been brought nearly three years after the accidental in-
juries were alleged to have been received and his family doctor had
told the employee within four days of that date that he had suffered
the back injury for which this suit sought compensation. The court,
in an opinion by Justice Prewitt, found that this was not an injury
which had gone undiscovered or had not developed until several
years after the accident thereby precluding the running of the statute
until that time.59
The court did not, however, find the employee's suit in Link v.
Southeastern Greyhound Lines60 barred by the statute of limitations.
The defendant named in the suit was Southeastern Greyhound Lines,
54. The court said the instant case was more analogous to York v. Federal
Chemical Co., 188 Tenn. 63, 216 S.W.2d 725 (1949) than to Ogle v. Tennessee
Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947) and McBrayer v. Dixie
Mercerizing Co., 176 Tenn-560, 144 S.W.2d 764 (1940), the cases on which the
employee relied.
55. 288 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. 1956).
56. The court distinguished the instant case from White v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
188 Tenn. 651, 222 S.W.2d 1 (1949) (employer recognized no liability beyond
that he assumed and paid, thus making the statute run from the date of
injury.)
57. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 50-1003 (1956).
58. 285 S.W.2d 136 (Tenn. 1955).
59. Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909
(1947).
60. 198 Tenn. 262, 279 S.W.2d 259 (1955).
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an operating unit of the Greyhound Corporation and not a legal entity.
After the statute of limitations had run, the trial court granted the
enployee's request to amend the complaint to name the corporation,
but it refused to make the amendment retroactive, thereby causing
the suit to be barred by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed,
in an opinion by Justice Swepston. The court held that the amend-
ment did not bring in a new party. The employee was regarded as
intending to sue the corporation, his employer, and the amendment
amounted only to a correction of a misnomer, not the substitution of
a new party. Accordingly, it should have been retroactive, thereby
causing the suit to be seasonably brought. There would seem to be
little question about this result and its support in Tennessee prece-
dent.
61
The most important decision of the Supreme Court with respect to
statute of limitations in workmen's compensation cases came in
Griffitts v. Humphrey.62 As stated in Justice Burnett's opinion:
We are faced flatly with the proposition of when the statute of limi-
tations starts to run in a Workmen's Compensation case. Whether from
the date of accident or from the date of known disability resulting from a
previous accident. Heretofore this Court has determined the matter in
one instance from the date of the accident and in others from the date
of known disability. The question now is should we say that the cases
in which the time of the running of the statute is fixed at the time of
the known disability should be segregated and held as applying only
to the facts of those particular cases or should we now adopt a rule which
is applicable in Workmen's Compensation cases to all of such cases? We
are faced flatly with this proposition and will attempt to answer it.
The opinion recognizes frankly the different wordings in Williams
code section 6874 ("accident") and 6884 ("injury") 63 and the divergent
lines of authority stemming from its decisions in Graham v. J. W.
Wells Brick Co.6 and Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp.
65
[Ujnder the doctrine of stare decisis the Graham case was attempted to
be sidestepped very gently. It now behooves us to make a clear dis-
tinction.66
The opinion proceeds to make clear that the approach of the Ogle case
is to be the general rule, i.e., the statute of limitations commences to
run at the time the injury accrues, or is determined to be compensable,
rather than at the time of the accident. This is the proper construction,
61. Cf. Love v. Southern Ry., 108 Tenn. 104, 65 S.W. 475 (1901). See'Morgan,
Procedure and Evidence-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1074
(1955).
62. 288 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1956).
63. Now TENN. CODE ANx. §§ 50-1003, 50-1017 (1956).
64. 150 Tenn. 660, 266 S.W. 770 (1924).
65. 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947).
66. 288 S.W.2d at 3.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the opinion states, not only because of the relative position of the
two words in the statute but, more basically, because the contrary
holding would defeat the basic purposes of the law by making the
statute of limitations begin to run before the cause of action accrues.
Subrogation and Third Party Liability: Reece v. York 67 was a case
of first impression in Tennessee. The employee's injuries resulted from
a third party's tort, and the employer was subrogated to the judgment
the employee obtained against the third party. However, after de-
ducting the employer's medical payments from the judgment, the
employer's compensation liability exceeded the net amount of the
judgment. The Supreme Court held that when an employee has re-
covered an award against a third party tort-feasor which, because of
statutory subrogation, has been credited against the employer's lia-
bility to the employee, he may not be required to begin making weekly
installment payments to the employee until the sum total of net credits
of weekly installments that would have accrued from the date of
injury are equal to the net credit of the award against the third party
tort-feasor.68 The credit the employer had received from the tort
recovery amounted to substantially more than would have been due
the employee in compensation payments when the compensation
award was made. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the lower
court for a determination of the date on which payments should begin.
The court found that if the employer had to begin making payments
from the time compensation was awarded, the employee would in
effect be receiving double benefits for a time. That would shorten
the duration of the period in which compensation would otherwise
have been payable. Such a result would not be desirable since com-
pensation payments are to be paid in weekly installments or as near
as may be to the manner in which the employee is accustomed to
receiving his wages.
69
The court's conclusion appears to be the logical one to be drawn
from considerations of the policies underlying the payment of com-
pensation in periodic installments. The employee is in the same situa-
tion he would have been in if his injury had not been caused by the
third party's tort. In any event, the problem is not likely to arise
with any degree of frequency since tort recoveries may generally be
expected to exceed any compensation liability
67. 288 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1956).
68. In Millican v. Home Stores, Inc., 197 Tenn. 93, 270 S.W.2d 372 (1954)
the facts were similar to those in the instant case, and the lower court had
ordered installment payments to be made from the date of the compensation
award. However, the Supreme Court rejected arguments in the instant case
based on the stare decisis doctrine since the question of payment timing had
not been before it in the Millican case.
69. The court pointed out that the only exception is in the case of a lump
sum payment under TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1023 (1956).
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United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Elam,70 also presented a
question of first impression. The employer's standard workmen's
compensation policy carried an endorsement or rider binding the
insurer to provide medical and hospital benefits far in excess of the
maximum required by statute and subrogating the carrier to the ex-
tent of any payments under the clause to all the rights against third
parties vested by law in the employer, his employees, or their de-
pendents. An employee was allegedly injured by a third party and
instituted a suit to recover damages after he had received compen-
sation payments and medical benefits from his employer. A settle-
ment of the suit was reached, however, and it provided, among other
things, for indemnification of the employee for all sums he might
have to pay the carrier for compensation and medical benefits pro-
vided for him by his employer's insurance carrier. At the time the
settlement was agreed to, the carrier had expended or incurred lia-
bilities for approximately the maximum medical benefits provided
for in the policy. It therefore intervened in the employee's suit for
recovery under the settlement agreement of the compensation pay-
ments and all the medical and hospitalization expenses and liabilities
it had incurred. The trial court allowed recovery only of the com-
pensation payments and the maximum medical benefits required by
the compensation statute. The Supreme Court, however, modified this
to permit recovery of the total medical expenses as well.
The court held that the compensation statute subrogated the em-
ployer or his insurer for the compensation payments and the maximum
statutory medical liability, but not for any additional medical or
hospitalization benefits. The endorsement to- the insurance policy
was held to provide conventional subrogation between the employer
and the insurer for the excess medical benefits. The employee's agree-
ment to this subrogation arrangement was implied because he had
accepted the benefits and services authorized by it. He was held
to be required to take the obligations of the agreement along with its
benefits. The court found that the employer, and hence the insurer,
was not an intermeddler or mere volunteer in providing the benefits
because:
(1) He is satisfying a moral obligation.
(2) He has-a substantial interest in restoring his employees to service
and in maintaining good will by the knowledge of the protection afforded
them.
(3) The provision of such .excess medical and hospital protection is in
accord. with the intention of -the Legislature -in passing the Workmen's
Compensation Act. -
70. 198 Tenn. 194, 278 S.W.2d 693 (1955).
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(4) The provision of adequate medical and hospital services for the
rehabilitation of every injured employee is in keeping with sound public
policy.71
On rehearing, the court held that the insurance carrier could re-
cover both the amounts it had expended prior to the settlement agree-
ment and the amount of its incurred but unpaid liabilities at that
time. It was subrogated under the statute for the statutory sums mlid or
payable, and the insurance agreement provided subrogation for the ad-
ditional amounts paid or payable under the policy. The carrier had
incurred legal obligations for additional medical expenses before the
settlement was entered into, and it did not become a volunteer or
intermeddler by paying those obligations after the date of the settle-
ment. Further, the insurer had been unable to learn the terms of
the settlement until after it had actually paid all the obligations dt
had undertaken prior to the date of the settlement.
The court's decision in this case will at least not discourage the
making of similar agreements between employers and insurance
carriers and may even encourage them. Certainly such agreements
should be regarded as beneficial for employees since the maximum
medical benefits required by the compensation law may at times be
grossly inadequate, as the instant case demonstrates.
Liability of Successive Insurance Carriers: Wilson v. Van Buren
County72 involved a question of first impression when the case was
presented to the court for the second time.?3 The employee apparently
was suffering from undiagnosed silicosis when his employer changed
insurance carriers. When his condition was diagnosed as silicosis and
he became disabled, the second carrier's policy was in effect. The
court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Neil, affirmed the lower court's
determination that the second carrier alone was liable. It held that
by what is now code section 50-1101 the legislature had attempted
to fix a definite point at which liability for a compensable occupational
disease should be determined so as "to remove the issue from the
field of speculation as far as possible."?4 Since the statute makes the
employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously
exposed to the disease, and the insurance carrier at that time, liable
for the disability without "right to contribution from any prior em-
ployer or insurance carrier," the Supreme Court felt that the insur-
ance carrier at the time the employee's disease became disabling as
71. Id. at 218, 278 S.W.2d at 704.
72. 198 Tenn. 179, 278 S.W.2d 685 (1955).
73. For the prior opinion in the instant case, see Wilson v. Van Buren
County, 196 Tenn. 487, 268 S.W.2d 363 (1954). See also Larson & Murray, The
Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8 VAND. L.
REv. 181 (1955).
74. Wilson v. Van Buren County, 198 Tenn. 179, 184, 278 S.W.2d 685, 687
(1955).
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determined in the prior decision in the case should be solely liable
even though the disease had existed undiscovered during the term
of a prior insurer's policy. This result does not seem to be inconsistent
with decisions in other jurisdictionsJ 5 The court places primary
emphasis on the date the disease was identified to the petitioner as
a disabling occupational disease, not the date the disease was con-
tracted or disabling without being identified, for the purpose of de-
termining which insurer is liable. The court refused to attempt
any equitable apportionment of liability between the insurance car-
riers here on the ground that to do so would not serve the interests
of employees.
Priority of Claims: McKee v. Dever Bros76 presented a question
as to the relative status of a workmen's compensation claimant and
the holder of a note secured by a registered chattel mortgage for
priority of payment out of personalty covered by the mortgage ex-
ecuted by the employer. Judge Hickerson, for the Middle Section of
the Court of Appeals, reversed the chancellor and decreed priority
for the mortgagee in accordance with what are found to be express
provisions of the statute
77
75. See 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 11 § 95.20.
76. 284 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
77. TENN. CODEANN. § 50-1015 (1956).
